Why Is China Succeeding as a Peace Broker?

China’s efforts in peace-brokering are based on a mix of economic interest, conscious and transparent neutrality and chutzpah.

Given its rapid rise as an economic giant, China has been wanting to foster world peace by a variety of means, including brokering peace between warring parties, whether sovereign countries or no-state actors.  

China’s approach is based on observing neutrality between the contesting or warring parties; non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries; laying stress on infrastructural development; and fostering global schemes such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilizational Initiative (GCI).

China has so far played a constructive role in bringing about transitions in the perpetually disturbed Afghanistan; helped warring Iran and Saudi Arabia strike a deal; and initiated ceasefires agreements in war-torn Myanmar.

In all this, the bottom line has been a combination of China’s self-interest (mainly economic) and the long-term and sustainable interests of the parties in conflict.

Myanmar Ceasefire 

China’s latest bid for peace has been in Myanmar, a disturbed country no power in the world has wanted to enter as a peacemaker, partly because of the complexity of the problem and partly because Myanmar has no strategic value yet.

In the third of week of January 2025, China announced that it has mediated a ceasefire between the military government of Myanmar and an Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) called the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said in Beijing: “We hope that all parties will maintain the momentum of ceasefire and peace talks, earnestly implement existing common understandings, take the initiative in deescalating the situation on the ground, and further negotiate and settle relevant issues through dialogue.”

She added that China stands ready to actively promote talks and provide support for the peace process in northern Myanmar.

The MNDAA is made up of the ethnic Chinese Kokang minority inhabiting northeastern Myanmar, bordering China. The MNDAA is a member of the “Three Brotherhood Alliance”. Myanmar’s EAOs, including the MNDAA, have been fighting for decades for greater autonomy from the central government based in Yangon.

The EAOs are loosely allied with the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the pro-democracy armed resistance group among the majority Bamars, which was formed after the army’s February 2021 coup. The PDF’s membership is largely drawn from the majority Bamar community but is bitterly opposed to the junta, though the latter is composed entirely of Bamars.

Writing in The Irrawaddy, Bertil Lintner, a Swedish expert on Myanmar, says that China has once again shown that it is the “only outside power with the means, capacity, and motivation” to intervene in Myanmar’s internal conflicts. China has a vital interest in keeping the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) going. The CMEC provides China’s landlocked southwestern provinces with an outlet to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

China has had close military and political relations with some ethnic groups living near its western border, in addition to maintaining strong military ties with the ruling junta in Yangon. The Kokangs and Wa, who inhabit the Sino-Myanmar border on the Myanmar side, have had close links with China.

In early December 2024, the MNDAA passed a resolution to opt for Chinese arbitration. The MNDAA and its close ally, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), said that there will not “march on Mandalay” and escalate the conflict with the junta and antagonise the majority Bamar community. The TNLA also said that it would “always cooperate with China’s mediation efforts and continue to cooperate to achieve good results.”

The third member of the “Brotherhood Alliance”, the Arakan Army (AA), which has managed to overrun most of its homeland in Rakhine State, bordering Bangladesh, announced in December 2024 that it was ready to negotiate with the military regime.

Western peace-making outfits have had little success in Myanmar so far. Lintner notes that nothing constructive can be expected from ASEAN. ASEAN’s “Five-Point Consensus” formula, which was adopted a few months after the February 2021 coup, called for the immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue, and humanitarian assistance to areas affected by the fighting. However, this formula has proven to be a non-starter.

As Lintner points out,  ASEAN has never, in its 58-year history, managed to solve a single bilateral conflict or dispute between its 10 member countries, let alone end an internal crisis in a member state. Western countries have outsourced the Myanmar issue to ASEAN without looking at its antecedents, Lintner says.

Kachins, Karens and Chins Defy  

Lintner notes that not all EAOs are eager for peace. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) ignored China’s 2024 request not to seize control of the border town of Pangwa. China has even less influence in areas along the Thai border, where Karen and Karenni resistance forces are active. It has no control over the Chins in the west, bordering India.

But there is a question nobody seems to have asked: “Will the Bamar, who are the majority community in Myanmar, agree to the ethnic groups’ demand for autonomy or independence?” True, the mainly Bamar People’s Defence Forces (PDF) has been fighting alongside the ethnic armies against the junta, but fighting for democratic institutions is one thing and rendering justice to ethnic and religious minorities is another ballgame altogether.

As a mediator, China will have to face this issue of demands and goals. Can China view its economic interests in isolation from political issues? Lintner raises another interesting doubt: whether the emergence of a strong, peaceful, democratic, and federal Myanmar is in China’s strategic interest.

Be that as it may, there is another hard reality to be faced: It is highly unlikely that the Myanmar junta will be defeated any time soon. And it is doubtful whether the resistance will be strong and united enough to unseat the junta.

Saudi-Iran Deal

In March 2023, China successfully mediated a peace treaty between Iran and Saudi Arabia. According to Barnett R. Rubin of the Stimson Centre, both Iran and Saudi Arabia wanted good relations with China, and neither saw China as a threat. These two factors helped China mediate the deal.

Rubin suggests that there is a lesson here for the US. To negotiate with Iran one day, the US will need to have some sort of relationship with Tehran, which it does not have at present. If President Trump were to negotiate a deal with Iran, he could take China’s help, as China already has Iran’s ear. China might respond favourably, as, like the US, it also wants peace in the Persian Gulf.

Trump could also take China’s help in bringing about a ceasefire in Ukraine, as both Putin and Zelensky view China as neutral. In fact, China had wanted to mediate in Ukraine. Trump has also suggested that he would mediate. Given Putin’s economic dependence on China, the Russian leader may be more inclined to listen.

Rubin discusses China’s role in mediation efforts in Afghanistan. China is interested in tapping Afghanistan’s natural resources (lithium, coal, iron, copper, oil, and gas), which is one reason behind its search for peace. Insecurity and conflict in Afghanistan threaten the security of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia and Pakistan, especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

At various stages, China had tried to mediate in conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between the Afghan government, the Northern Alliance, and the Taliban. It had done so through both confidential and public meetings, bilaterally, trilaterally, and quadrilaterally, involving the US, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban. In all these meetings, China’s neutrality has ensured its acceptability as a mediator.

Even in the midst of the war and peace talks, Chinese companies have been trying to invest in the extraction of natural resources from Afghanistan. In 2007, a major mining firm signed a contract to open what is potentially the world’s largest copper mine in Mes Aynak, in Logar province. Other companies have also signed joint venture agreements with Watan Industries, an Afghan company, to exploit the oil and gas resources of the Amu Darya basin in Jawzjan province.

To sum up, a mix of economic interest, conscious neutrality, and chutzpah has helped China navigate the turbulent waters of mediation between sworn enemies, score some successes, and raise hopes for a more productive future as a peace broker.