Even as the Boeing 787 is dogged by technical issues, the parlous state of the Indian aircraft maintenance sector is adding to anxieties over aviation safety.

It hasn’t been a dream run for the much-touted Boeing Dreamliner 787, though the crash in Ahmedabad on 12 June was the first of that kind since the 787 entered global aviation 14 years ago.

But a closer examination of the performance of the Dreamliner would show that its journey from the inception of the project in 2008 till now had not been smooth at all. Questions of quality and safety had dogged it. At the Indian end, the parlous state of the Indian aircraft maintenance sector is adding to the already grave problem of aviation safety.

On 15 June, three days after the Ahmedabad crash, American Airlines flight AA278 declared an emergency on approaching Edinburgh. A London–Chennai Dreamliner flight of British Airways returned to London due to a “technical issue.”

The Telegraph of the UK reported on 12 June that the Boeing 787 had made four emergency landings in a month. Some of the incidents were linked to issues with its wing flaps. Boeing shares came down by % as news of the Ahmedabad tragedy spread.

On 7 June, a 787 was initially forced to return to Amsterdam after a problem with its flaps was detected shortly after take-off for Philadelphia. The aircraft dumped fuel over the North Sea before landing at Schiphol Airport at a higher-than-normal speed, attributed to the flaps problem. The flight was cancelled after its crew discovered a hydraulics issue. In the following weeks, the plane was forced to abort flights to Philadelphia from Dublin, Barcelona and Zurich.

Faulty Engineering

Sam Salehpour, a Boeing engineer, came forward in 2021 with claims that the firm had cut corners on the Dreamliner, allowing “faulty engineering and faulty evaluation of the data” which meant that defective parts had potentially been installed in some planes. Salehpour claimed to have noticed issues with the filling in of gaps between fuselage segments, known as shimming, which he said could cause fatigue cracks over repeated flights.

John Barnett, another whistle-blower, alleged that Boeing repeatedly falsified or ignored vital quality checks at a plant in North Carolina where some of its 787s are assembled. Barnett – a quality inspector who was later found dead aged 62 – also warned of problems with emergency oxygen systems and his discovery of metal shavings that he said posed a risk of shorting to electrical systems. Barnett claimed that paperwork had been falsified.

Six years earlier, two smaller 737 Max planes claimed 346 lives and plunged Boeing into a near-existential crisis. The Max, Boeing’s top seller, was grounded around the world for more than 18 months after investigators found that the crashes in 2018 and 2019 had been caused by software meant to improve the aircraft’s handling. The Max was allowed to return to service, but a cap was imposed on build rates, reducing deliveries to a trickle.

In February 2023, Boeing temporarily halted deliveries of the 787 to conduct additional analysis on a fuselage component. Deliveries could not resume until the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was satisfied that the issue had been addressed.

Trouble visited Boeing again in 2024, when the FAA said it was investigating claims by a staff engineer that parts of the fuselage (body) of the Dreamliner were improperly fastened together. Boeing stoutly disputed that.

Outsourcing Root Cause

In an in-depth report on the Dreamliner, the Aero News Journal (ANJ) dated 17 March 2025 (see https://www.aeronewsjournal.com/2025/03/boeings-dreamliner-turning-into.html) said that the troubles stemmed from Boeing’s policy of outsourcing its work. Seventy percent of the design, engineering, fabrication and testing of the aircraft had been outsourced to a global network of suppliers. This was intended to reduce costs.

But costs actually mounted. While the initial cost projection was US$5 billion with the first deliveries slated for 2008, it ballooned to US$22 billion by the time the first deliveries were made in 2011.

Outsourcing had led to incompatible parts being supplied. The company found it difficult to integrate the disparate components. The production process was fragmented. Suppliers struggled to meet Boeing’s timetable, which resulted in substandard work.

Poor Labour Quality

The Dreamliner’s production woes gained renewed attention recently because of perceived inefficiencies in Boeing’s plant in North Charleston, South Carolina. Unlike the company’s traditional manufacturing hub at Everett, Washington, the South Carolina plant was trying to reduce labour costs by using a non-unionised workforce. Naturally, quality issues emerged, the Journal said.

Speed was prioritised over precision, compromising safety standards. Whistle-blower accounts were painting a scary picture of the conditions in the South Carolina plant. An undercover investigation revealed that some employees had even expressed reluctance to fly on the very planes they built.

According to the Aero News Journal, the FAA repeatedly intervened, halting deliveries of the Dreamliner 787 multiple times since 2020 to address manufacturing flaws. “The issues ranged from improperly spaced fasteners and gaps in the fuselage to substandard titanium components sourced from suppliers.”

Italian Case

Problems with the Dreamliner came to light again in early 2025 when the Italian authorities uncovered a massive fraud involving over 4,800 defective parts installed in Boeing 787s. The investigation centred on an Italian contractor who allegedly falsified quality certifications for components supplied.

“These parts, ranging from structural fittings to hydraulic systems, were deemed non-compliant with aerospace standards. In response, the FAA ordered inspections of 145 operational Dreamliners to identify and replace the faulty components,” the Aero News Journal reported.

Engine Woes

Beyond airframe issues, the Dreamliner faced challenges with its engines, supplied by Rolls-Royce and General Electric. “The Rolls-Royce Trent 1000, one of the two engine options for the 787, has been plagued by durability problems, including blade cracking and corrosion.”  

Cost-Cutting

Critics argue that the company’s shift toward cost-cutting in the late 1990s and 2000s – epitomised by its merger with McDonnell Douglas – prioritised profit over engineering excellence.

“Former employees, including engineers and quality inspectors, alleged that Boeing pressured staff to overlook defects or approve substandard work to keep production on track. The FAA and congressional investigations substantiated some of the concerns, levying fines and mandating corrective actions,” the Journal says.

Indian Aircraft Maintenance Sector

The problems are compounded by maintenance issues in India. The government is keen on expanding and improving aviation, but the Indian Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) sector is beset with problems and is crying for attention, points out Niti Aayog, a government agency.

Niti Aayog lists the reasons for the MROs’ parlous condition. The increased presence of Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in the Indian MRO sector has adversely affected the latter’s prospects. The foreign OEMs insist on adherence to their Intellectual Property (IP) rights. They charge exorbitant consultancy fees. There has also been a sharp increase in the price of OEM-supplied materials.

The OEMs purchase critical spares from the spare parts market and force Indian MROs to buy new parts directly from OEMs. Boeing sometimes limits access to used or repaired parts only to maintain control over pricing and quality.

Besides a reluctance to share information, OEMs provide contractual conditionalities in exchange for discounts on the price of their aircraft engines and components. These conditionalities usually mandate airline operators to provide after-market services or are characterised by Power-by-the-Hour (PBH) contracts at their designated MRO shops. Since most of these MRO shops are situated outside India, Indian MROs lose business, Niti Aayog points out.

Another infrastructural bottleneck faced by the Indian MRO sector is the lack of training infrastructure locally. At least 20–30 Indian institutes do not have an aircraft for training!

The MRO sector is capital-intensive, but access to credit has either been very limited for MRO operators or has been accompanied by exorbitant collateral demands.

Airline operators often require Indian MROs to adhere to US FAA or European Union Safety Agency (EASA) standards. This drives away the majority of the MRO business out of India. European authorities or countries following EASA often do not recognise Indian Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) certifications. In the last few decades, harmonisation has been done between DGCA and EASA requirements. But despite having FAA and DGCA approval, European lessors’ aircraft are maintained in Europe rather than in India.

High Taxation

The Indian Goods and Services Tax (GST) levied on MRO services was brought down from 18% to 5%, but GST on spares still ranges from 15% to 28%. Since there is no incentive to manufacture components in India itself, the MRO sector has to import finished components. But ambiguities in the customs laws on classification of raw materials, such as paints, aircraft parts and components, often lead to augmented duties or taxes. Components such as paint, microwaves, LCD screens, etc., that are specifically built for aircraft installation, are not interpreted as such by the customs department, and therefore, considerable duties are charged, Niti Aayog points out.

Further, the Airports Authority of India (AAI) continues to levy airport royalty on the Gross Turnover (GTO) under several categories such as ground handling, revenue sharing, demurrage, and so on, which ranges from 11% to 20%. Such charges, paid for utilising airport services, negatively impact the MRO sector’s competitiveness.

The MRO sector should therefore be expanded and modernised to keep up with the expansion of national and international aviation and their changing demands with technological improvements.