The planned US$9 billion deep-water trans-shipment port at Galathea Bay in Car Nicobar makes greater vigilance in the BOB imperative.
Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina alleged that the US would not have schemed to oust her from power if she had handed over St. Martin’s Island in the Bay of Bengal. The US has denied the charge.
But earlier, when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, the Pakistani government had offered the island to the US.
Currently, the island is a subject of dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar. It is inhabited by about 10,000 Bangladeshi fishermen and Rohingya refugees from Myanmar.
Be that as it may, Hasina’s allegation brought into focus the strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal (BOB). The BOB is at the crossroads between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, through which extensive maritime traffic transits. Although full-scale wars are unlikely to be fought in the BOB, it is a “grey zone” where there could be military operations below the threshold of high-intensity conflict between the US and India on the one hand and China on the other.
In a paper published by the Centre for International Maritime Security, University of Texas scholar Mohammad Rubaiyat Rahman explains that a range of non-military competitive actions falls under the rubric of “grey zone.”
Adversaries could impede economic exploitation or hamper safe passage through the BOB. An adversarial country could assert its maritime interests at the expense of other states in the grey zone.
Enter China
China’s relentless endeavour to penetrate the BOB through Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka makes it a grey zone for the US and India.
BOB littoral states like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have depended on China for economic and infrastructure development. China has constructed ports, roads, pipelines, and railways in these littoral states. In the eyes of the US, these developmental activities constitute China’s “grey zone activities” in the BOB with potential strategic value.
To the US, these projects enhance China’s military access in the region. America also fears that China is gaining significant political leverage over decision-making in these countries.
Rahman points out that for many littoral states of the BOB, China is a major supplier of military hardware. Bangladesh has operationalised its only submarine base, BNS Sheikh Hasina, which was constructed with Chinese financial and technical assistance.
According to Rahman, China sold two Type 035 G Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh in 2016 and a B-variant Ming-class submarine to Myanmar in 2021. Chinese submarine crews were stationed in these countries for training purposes. These deals enhance China’s competitiveness in the BOB grey zone.
Thailand has signed deals with China to acquire surface warships and submarines for its navy. Myanmar’s extension of airstrips and construction of aviation hangars on Great Coco Island suggest Chinese involvement and potential uses for maritime surveillance, Rahman writes.
Oceanographic survey vessel activity and undersea operations are also part of grey zone operations. The frequent visits of Chinese oceanographic survey vessels indicate that China is seeking a better understanding of the undersea environment in the BOB. These activities pave the way for submarine operations.
The oceanographic vessel Shi Yan 1 operated in the Indian exclusive economic zone adjacent to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Xiang Yang Hong 06 conducted joint scientific surveys in Myanmar’s territorial sea in February 2020. Prior to this, the same vessel had conducted research on the seabed of Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, according to Rahman.
These survey vessels also often switch off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders, which makes it difficult to track their locations and activities.
India’s Response
The Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region exchanges information with select partners in the BOB. The littoral states of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar are among the partners in this security collaboration structure. The Indian Navy has deployed coastal surveillance radar systems in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar.
“India has purchased twelve American-made P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, the sale of which the US encouraged as a way to deepen its security ties with India. The P-8Is offer not only superior surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, but also greater speed and longer endurance, making them better anti-submarine warfare platforms.”
“India also established the Baaz naval air station on Great Nicobar Island at the southern end of the Nicobar Islands, only 450 km from the Malacca Strait. From the start, India intended to extend the station’s 3,500-foot runway to accommodate the P-8Is. While the runway was lengthened by 800 feet by 2022, environmental concerns have slowed further construction,” Rahman notes.
He further says that in 2019, India established the Kohassa naval air station on North Andaman Island, a suspected Chinese intelligence outpost on Myanmar’s Coco Island.
According to Rahman, India has plans to extend the Kohassa station’s runway to accommodate P-8Is. At the time of writing, only the Utkrosh naval air station in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands has a runway long enough to service the new aircraft. That station is currently home to a squadron of short-range Do-228 maritime patrol aircraft.
“More broadly, in 2019, India announced a ten-year infrastructure upgrade program to deploy new aircraft, warships, and anti-ship missile batteries throughout the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Some elements have now been deployed. The Indian navy rebased a Kora-class guided-missile corvette to Port Blair, and the Indian air force established a forward base for its Su-30MKI fighters on Car Nicobar. The Indian army has test fired its Brahmos anti-ship missiles from the islands.”
Though the Indian Navy is strengthening itself, it is the US Navy which needs to helm the anti-Chinese grey zone operations, Rahman recommends.
Through the Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET), the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and the Malabar Exercise, the U.S. Navy has helped regional navies support maritime security and maritime domain awareness in the BOB through exercises such as the Malabar exercise.
The Malabar exercise involves mobile anti-submarine training target exercise, cross-deck helicopter operations, and surface gunnery exercises.
Andaman Islands
The Andaman and Nicobar (A and N) Islands, which are part of India, are key to India’s security. The A and N islands are only 22 miles from Myanmar. At the southern end, the Indira Point is just 90 miles from Indonesia’s Aceh province and the coast of Thailand lies 270 miles to the east.
In stark contrast, Port Blair, the capital of And N islands, is about 850 miles from Chennai and Kolkata.
Only 31 of the Andaman archipelago’s 836 islands are inhabited, which means that some of them could be surreptitiously occupied and used against Indian and Western shipping, warns former Indian naval chief, Admiral Arun Prakash in the Indian Express.
Prakash recalls that as early as in 1962, a Chinese submarine was sighted off the Andamans. In September 1965, after the commencement of India-Pakistan war, Pakistani President Ayub Khan sent retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan as an emissary to seek support from Indonesia.
Air Marshal Khan was taken aback when the Indonesian navy chief, Admiral Martadinata, asked him: “Don’t you want us to take over the Andaman Islands? They are an extension of Sumatra and are, in any case, between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right have the Indians to be there?”
Since then, India has upgraded the detachment in the Andaman and Nicobar islands to a joint/unified operational command — the Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC) in Port Blair.
Admiral Arun Prakash recommends that the base in the Andamans maintain three-dimensional maritime domain awareness through networked assets, including radars, aircraft, satellites, and unmanned vehicles. The command must be equipped with adequate defensive and offensive firepower, as well as rapid-reaction forces with amphibious and airlift capabilities.
Trans-shipment Port
India plans to build a deep-water trans-shipment terminal (GNIICTT) at Galathea Bay in Car Nicobar to serve East-West international traffic. To be built at a cost of US$9 billion by 2028, this great economic asset will also need to be defended.
