India found itself out of step at the two SCO conclaves held in China recently. And New Delhi’s effort to mend fences with Beijing lacked credibility, given the widely held impression that its notion of “strategic autonomy” is devoid of commitments to stated policies and principles.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) came into being in 2001 with the focus on intra-regional cooperation to curb terrorism, separatism and extremism in Central Asia. But in the last 24 years of its existence, the China-led SCO has been transformed into a mechanism to advance connectivity, trade and investment.
Although terrorism is mentioned in SCO’s statements, it is generally said in passing and within the broader rubric of regional security.
While the SCO, as a grouping, has moved on to broader issues of common concern such as connectivity and economic cooperation, India continues to harp on the terrorist threat faced by it from Pakistan.
This is partly due to the severity of the threat, and partly due to the electoral dividends that hostility to Pakistan provides to the ruling BJP. A reluctance to be part of the China-led economic agenda that Beijing tends to advance at the SCO is also a factor.
At Tianjin, India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar demanded an “uncompromising stand against terrorism” in his speech. But China saw to it that terrorism did not figure in the agenda for the SCO summit to be held at Tianjin at the end of August, with China in the chair.
Earlier too, Pahalgam was not mentioned in the joint statement that was to be made after the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting in June at Qingdao. Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had refused to sign it in the absence of a mention.
The omission of terrorism was only partly due to China’s “iron-clad” friendship with Pakistan. It was also due to the fact that terrorism had ceased to be the core concern of the SCO. China’s concern, and the concern of the SCO, has been the US-led campaign to scuttle China’s global expansion through its connectivity projects. And China sees India as a key member of the American camp.
However, India managed to have its way at the BRICS summit at Rio de Janeiro and at the QUAD meeting in Washington. In the absence of Xi Jinping, the Pahalgam attack was highlighted in the joint statements that emanated from Rio and Washington.
Pakistan’s Stand
In contrast to Jaishankar’s advocacy of strong action against terrorism, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, did not even refer to terrorism, though he alluded to the Kashmir dispute without mentioning Kashmir. Dar’s accent was on “upholding international law and implementing relevant UNSC resolutions to resolve longstanding disputes.”
And in tune with the Chinese and Russian thinking on the Israel-Iran war, Dar strongly condemned the US-Israeli bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities.
But even on the Israel-Iran issue, which was a Global South vs the Global North issue, India turned out to be the outlier. Jaishankar avoided any reference to the bombing of Iran because Israel and the US are its strategic partners against China.
India’s Olive Branch
However, India showed a manifest eagerness to mend fences with China at Tianjin. Faced as it is with US President Donald Trump’s belligerence on the question of tariffs and his tendency to equate India and Pakistan, India feels the need to look for new friends.
In his speech at Tianjin, S. Jaishankar said that the India-China bilateral relationship had been “steadily improving” and hoped that the “positive trajectory” would be kept up. “As neighbouring nations and major economies, an open exchange of views and perspectives between India and China is very important,” he said.
The reasons for the softening of the approach to China are not far to seek. India needs to boost its industrial sector to be able to export more. And the only country that can help India do it is China. India also has to narrow the yawning trade gap with China, which is now US$100 billion.
India is starkly dependent on China for the supply of a wide range of products, from the simplest like nails/tacks and umbrellas to sophisticated electronics and pharmaceutical intermediates. Chinese domination in the import of telecom and electronic products has increased manifold over the past few years after the New Delhi government initiated the Digital India programme in 2015, points out economics researcher Biswajit Dhar in The India Forum.
Fairly large volumes of mobile phones are sourced from China. In 2019–20, more than 83% of imports of mobile phones were of Chinese origin. In the same year, nearly 90% of colour TV sets imported into the country were from China. India continues to depend substantially on imports of Chinese telecom transmission equipment. The dependence on China to build India’s solar power sector and get cranes for its ports is also heavy.
India needs Chinese intermediates to make generic drugs and continue to be the “pharmacy of the world”. India has been completely dependent on China for the import of streptomycin. There is a high level of dependence in regard to other antibiotics like ciprofloxacin. China has also been supplying intermediates for rifampicin, used for treating several bacterial infections including tuberculosis. More than 95% of imports of penicillin in various forms have been from China. Any disruptions in supplies from China can cause serious bottlenecks, Biswajit Dhar warns.
Barrier to Sino-Indian Rapprochement
While China is keen on being in the Indian market and extending its presence, India has, at the back of its mind, serious security concerns about letting Chinese telecommunication technology enter the country. It has erected barriers in the guise of regulating trade with countries which have a border with India, and China is one of them. And after brutal clashes between the Indian and Chinese militaries on the Sino-Indian border, India banned more than 50 Chinese apps including the popular TikTok.
But it remains to be seen if China will go halfway to meet India’s wishes, given the fact that Sino-Indian relations have consistently lacked trust.
Relations touched the nadir recently when India’s army brass accused China of backing Pakistan in the four-day Operation Sindoor in May. On its part, China described India’s backing the Dalai Lama on the succession issue as “shooting itself in the foot.” For Beijing, the issue of Tibet and the Dalai Lama is part of the “One China” concept, which is the core of Chinese nationalism and the touchstone of friendship.
Weakness of Strategic Autonomy
The Narendra Modi government’s foreign policy, based on its notion of “strategic autonomy”, marked by a narrow emphasis on isolating Pakistan and resisting China, and its disregard for reciprocal obligations to countries and groupings it is part of, has proved to be a disaster.
After Operation Sindoor, New Delhi discovered that it had no friends in the world barring Israel and the Taliban of Afghanistan. Its policy of wanting to be with the Global South and the Global North simultaneously boomeranged.
The need of the hour is therefore a thorough overhaul of India’s foreign policy, which should include complete detachment from domestic electoral politics. The tie-up with domestic political exigencies has maintained tension with Pakistan, and has created fears in neighbours like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The periodic raking up of the Kachchativu issue disturbs Sri Lankans, and the “illegal immigrants” issue angers Bangladeshis.