The axis linking Pakistan, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan has been in existence for some time. However, it gained salience in the Indian Subcontinent only during the India-Pakistan war from 7 to 10 May, triggered by a terror strike in Kashmir on 22 April.

While other countries expressed concern over terrorism without naming Pakistan, Türkiye and Azerbaijan openly backed Pakistan after India pointed an accusing finger at Islamabad.

After the short air war, in which the Pakistan Air Force used Turkish drones alongside Chinese fighter jets, Indians imposed an informal boycott of Turkish products and companies.

India-Türkiye trade is substantial. India’s imports from Türkiye stood at US$3.78 billion in 2023-24. Major items imported by India from Türkiye included mineral fuels and oils (US$1.8 billion), nuclear reactors and parts (US$311 million), salt and plastering materials (US$235 million), inorganic chemicals (US$188 million), natural and precious pearls (US$132 million), animal products (US$149 million), among others.

The Indian traders’ boycott is expected to impact imports of apples, carpets, textiles, furniture, home décor, and confectionery from Türkiye, as well as dry fruits and beverages from Azerbaijan.

Basis of the Axis 

The Türkiye-Pakistan-Azerbaijan axis is based on three factors:

The first factor is religion: all three are Islamic countries. The second factor is that Azerbaijan and Pakistan have been engaged in religious and territorial conflicts with their neighbours, Armenia and India respectively. While Armenia is Christian, India is a Hindu-majority country.

Being an Islamic country, Türkiye has been supporting Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which lies within Azerbaijan. Türkiye is also supporting Pakistan in its conflict with India over Kashmir.

Nogorno Karabakh

The landlocked region of Nagorno-Karabakh had been the subject of a long-standing territorial dispute between Azerbaijan, in which it lies, and Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian majority, backed by neighbouring Armenia.

Following decades of sporadic clashes and upsurges of violence, Azerbaijani forces overwhelmed Nagorno-Karabakh’s defenders in September 2023. The majority of ethnic Armenians fled, and on 1 January 2024, Nagorno-Karabakh was formally dissolved.

Armenia was supported by Russia, while Azerbaijan was supported by Türkiye and Pakistan. India was sympathetic to Armenia and developed defence ties with Armenia.

The third factor in the axis is Türkiye’s ambition to become a powerful international player, especially in the Islamic world, challenging the traditional leadership of Saudi Arabia.

Straddling West and South Asia 

Writing for Türkiye’s Anadolu News Agency, Dr Furkan Kaya, Associate Professor at Yeditepe University, said: “One of the most important features of the Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan strategic triangle is the potential for establishing a multifaceted direct dialogue between the Turkic world and the South Asian Islamic world.”

He recalled that during Türkiye’s struggle to re-establish itself after World War I, significant support was provided by Asian Muslims which resulted in the founding of the Republic of Türkiye.

Sultan Zahidov, advisor at the Centre for the Analysis of International Relations, pointed out that when tensions arose between Pakistan and India in April-May 2025, Islamabad first reached out to Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Similarly, Türkiye and Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War “was a clear example of the unwavering solidarity within this axis.”

In the “Three Brothers” military exercises held in Baku in 2021, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan demonstrated their potential to form a bloc based on “common national values,” Zahidov said.

Türkiye-Azerbaijan Strategic Alliance

With the declaration signed in Shusha on 15 June 2021 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev, relations between the two countries were officially raised to the level of a “strategic alliance.” In 2023, with the “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk” exercise held in Nakhchivan, the two countries demonstrated their joint military capabilities and military integration.

Türkiye-Pakistan Economic and Defence Ties

In February this year, Pakistan and Türkiye signed a series of MoUs across various sectors to enhance bilateral relations. Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was on a two-day visit to Pakistan, witnessed the exchange of these accords.

The MoUs covered cooperation in air force electronic warfare, defence industries, aerospace industries, and naval research. Other fields included energy transition, mining, as well as religious services and religious education, emphasising the Islamic content in the relations.

According to Dr Furkan Kaya, the foundation of ties between Türkiye and Pakistan was cooperation between the defence industries of the two countries. A US$1.5 billion contract signed with Pakistan in 2018 resulted in the delivery of the “Babur” class frigates to Pakistan.

“This strategic line formed by Ankara, Baku, and Islamabad covers the most sensitive regions of Eurasia. In addition to ensuring the security of both East-West and North-South transport corridors, this axis has the potential to contribute to the stability and economic development of the Eurasian continent,” Dr Kaya pointed out.

“Future transport, energy, and trade projects to be implemented in the Eurasian region will further strengthen this trilateral cooperation,” he added.

Türkiye Leadership Bid

Türkiye has been playing a leadership role in the Eurasian region. According to Foreign Affairs, Türkiye now has the third-highest number of diplomatic missions in the world, trailing only China and the United States.

In conflicts in the South Caucasus, the Black Sea region, and the Middle East and North Africa, Türkiye has played an increasingly assertive role.

“Throughout Syria’s civil war, which began in 2011, Türkiye had boldly opposed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and provided material support to groups fighting against his rule. Against all odds, Türkiye’s policy had paid off. Ankara’s adversary is gone, and the victory of Turkish-supported opposition groups has given it a direct line to Damascus,” Foreign Affairs pointed out.

Indigenous Arms Industry

Regional instability and the deterioration of security ties with Western partners have compelled Türkiye to develop indigenous domestic defence and aerospace technologies. Large-scale government and private investments have fuelled the growth of Türkiye’s drone industry. The Bayraktar TB2 drone has been used in various conflicts, including in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, Ukraine, and by Pakistan in the India-Pakistan war. Turkish arms are now exported to more than 30 countries. 

By 2024, Türkiye’s total defence and aerospace exports had soared to US$7.2 billion—a nearly 30% increase over the previous year. As of 2023, three Turkish defence contractors are among the world’s top 100 arms revenue earners.

Türkiye Straddles Opposing Sides

Türkiye straddles two opposing geopolitical worlds – the East and the West. Though a member of NATO, Ankara’s ties to the non-Western world are growing. Gaining influence across the global South has become a main pillar of Türkiye’s strategy.

In 2002, the country’s volume of trade with Asian countries, including China and Russia, was only half its volume of trade with the European Union. Two decades later, Türkiye’s trade with Asia had surpassed its trade with Europe. 

In 2012, Türkiye became a dialogue partner of the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2015, hoping to unite its own Middle Corridor project—which envisions transport infrastructure connecting East Asia to Europe via Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Türkiye—with the Belt and Road Initiative in one big transcontinental network, Foreign Affairs said.

On the Russian-Chinese side, Türkiye’s economic interest is deepening. In 2024, total trade with these two countries reached US$101 billion.

But the Turkish economy still needs Western markets and capital to sustain its growth, Foreign Affairs pointed out. Türkiye exports roughly as much to the EU as it imports. Almost 70% of foreign direct investment comes from the EU and the United States.

Türkiye is playing a balancing game even as it is taking some bold and adventurous steps to assert its presence and power. But this is a tricky business in a world of interdependencies, Foreign Affairs cautioned Ankara.